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ABSTRACT: Special Relativity is not a branch of electromagnetism: it does not depend on 
light’s having a constant, limiting speed. If the theory is true, it depends on no matter theory. 
Rather, very general and familiar symmetries of space and time impose the form of the 
Lorentz transformation on every matter theory, independently of any that obeys it. I explore 
this and its metaphysical consequences. 
 
Introduction 
 
Special Relativity (SR) is not a branch of electromagnetism: it does not 
depend on light’s having a constant, limiting speed. If the theory is true, it 
depends on no matter theory. Rather, very general and familiar symmetries of 
space and time impose the form of the Lorentz transformation on every 
matter theory, independently of any that obeys it. Spacetime rules. 
I aim to explore this and its metaphysical consequences in a style 
accessible to non-specialist philosophical readers. 
Minkowski first developed this approach in §1 of his path-breaking 
paper of 1908.2 That part of his message has retreated from the centre of 
attention. For some, it entered the basic folklore of SR – e.g. for more 
mathematically minded physicists. Many more know nothing of it – especially 
the majority of philosophers, including philosophers of science. For these, SR 
rests on the principle that nothing outstrips light, made vivid by the sheer 
brilliance of Einstein’s operationalist analysis of light-synchrony and 
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simultaneity. That is apt to be how we learn the theory. It has overshadowed 
the geometrical approach. 3  
But Minkowski arrived at the Lorentz metric, at spacetime and, 
therefore, SR ‘along a purely mathematical line of thought’  – that is, along a 
purely geometrical path from the symmetries of real - if you like, physical - 
space and time to the Lorentz transformation and the metric of spacetime 
(75). What earned first place in Minkowski’s lecture is the mathematical purity 
of the journey rather than where it began. Einstein’s revolution in physics 
could have been gained by bold mathematical conjecture based on known, 
empirical symmetries of space and time. Minkowski did not improve on 
Einstein’s theory: his theory differs in its foundations. It needs neither light, 
electromagnetism nor any other matter theory to sustain it. 4 
The opening four-sentence preamble to the lecture acknowledges that 
the new views of space and time ‘have sprung from the soil of experimental 
physics, and therein lies their strength’ (75). But Minkowski then goes straight 
to the mathematical approach. He concludes ‘… mathematics, though it can 
now display only stair-case wit, has the satisfaction of being wise after the 
event’ (79). 
Thus, in SR, spacetime itself lies at the foundation of matter theories, 
imposing its constraints on each one. Its structure yields the broad picture of 
the world that has shaped physics since 1905. Spacetime is sovereign and 
independent. 
I shall prune, amplify and simplify Minkowski’s rather informal 
discussion so as to track philosophical interests. I think it more intuitive than 
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the rigorous algebraic deductions that followed in 1910 (see §3). Its 
metaphysical, ontological importance is my main theme.5 
 
2 Minkowski’s ‘purely mathematical line of thought’  
 
Minkowski, ‘setting out from the accepted mechanics of the day’ (76)6 
begins by noting that two sorts of transformations leave Newton’s laws 
unchanged: changes of position and changes in uniform velocity. The first, in 
more detail, is the standard group of continuous spatial transformations – 
translations and rotations. (Reflections aren’t relevant here.) This means that 
the laws of physics are the same (invariant) everywhere and in any direction. 
The second, in more detail, is the Galilean group of transformations that take 
us from one inertial frame of reference to another. ‘Thus the two groups, side 
by side, lead their lives entirely apart’ (76). The aim is to unify them. How? 
Minkowki reminds us that no one observes times except at places or 
places except at times (76). Thus, space and time although crucially distinct 
are deeply connected, facts that neither group exploits. The two groups are 
incongruous in that the first contains an orthogonal rotation of the spatial 
coordinates. The second group is not rotational, but allows replacement of x, y 
and z with constant speeds in these spatial directions (79). Time enters into 
the Galilean group via this relative speed of frames of reference, and so 
appears in the transformation of x, y and z coordinates. Yet the time 
coordinate itself is not transformed: t remains t. This leads the Galilean group 
to be ‘treated with disdain’ (loc. cit.) since it thereby raises the embarrassing 
 4 
problem of absolute motion. Thus the orientation of the t axis to spatial ones 
is left entirely undetermined.  
Connecting the two into a satisfactorily unified group is easy. Choose 
a parameter, c, to tie space and time together in a single metrical structure 
rather like Euclid’s.  
 
ds2 = c2dt2 – dx2 – dy2 – dz2 
 
To forge the link, c must be a constant with dimensions of both space and 
time i.e. a speed. It then figures in the metric and transformations as a 
limiting constant. The new transformations rotate space and time together, 
not as a pointless spatial rotation in one more dimension, but, by changing 
the sign of the x differentials, as a rotation in spacetime. That yields the form 
of the Lorentz transformations, but only its form. The argument assigns no 
value to the constant, c. Light or electromagnetism appear nowhere: that is 
the crucial feature. 
Nothing yet determines the value of c – more on this later §5 (ii). It is 
to be found by observation, not necessarily observations on light. The value 
must lie in the interval 0 ≤ c ≤ ∞. Values within the limits are ‘mathematically 
more intelligible’ (79) than either limit is, even though the upper limit defines 
the familiar Galilean group. A limit of zero speed is unbearably queer.7 
Infinite speed is queer, too: along its line of motion the thing is everywhere at 
once! A finite, invariant limiting speed forbids velocities, as ordinarily 
conceived, to add arithmetically. This offends one intuition but rescues 
another from obscurity: spatiotemporal continuity, and thereby both identity 
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and causality make better sense.8 Minkowski doesn’t mention these 
metaphysical grounds in seeing a finite speed as mathematically the more 
intelligible. Perhaps he recognised them. Thus, requirements of sense and 
elegance lead to a finite constant, c, for the Lorentz group, and so to the 
structure of Minkowski’s spacetime. While transformations leave physical laws 
the same in each frame, they no longer leave the properties of things 
invariant.  
Group theory has general objective criteria for simplicity. The 
Lorentz group is semi-simple; the classical Galilean group is not.9 
The upshot is a full rotational transformation group: change of 
inertial frame (boost) rotates all coordinate axes (through a pseudo-angle for 
time). A boost is an angular, geometrical, transformation. A thing (particle) is 
then a material curve in spacetime, a worldline if it is straight.10 
Here are Minkowski’s own words on how an audacious 
mathematician might have done it.  
Group Gc in the limit when c = ∞, that is the group G∞, 
becomes no other than that complete group which is 
appropriate to Newtonian mechanics. This being so, and since 
Gc is mathematically more intelligible than G∞, it looks as 
though the thought might have struck some mathematician, 
fancy-free, that after all, as a matter of fact, natural 
phenomena do not possess an invariance with the group G∞, 
but rather with the group Gc, c being finite and determinate, 
but in ordinary units of measure, extremely great. Such a 
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premonition would have been an extraordinary triumph for 
pure mathematics.  
Minkowski, H. op. cit (79) [Original italics.] 
 
Clearly, the line of thought is speculative – fancy-free, not 
deductive. Neither its premises nor its conclusions are a priori or 
necessarily true. It has to match the world. 
 
3 An algebraic approach 
 
Newton’s title ‘Corollary V’ for his discussion of the motion of relative 
spaces implies that his Laws of Motion entail Galilean relativity. It must have 
seemed obvious that relative motions must inevitably retain, as invariants, all 
properties of things that could consistently be taken as invariant. That delivers 
the Galilean transformations. Yet Newton made no serious attempt to derive 
them. We now know that the conclusion does not follow. Einstein gave the 
decisive counterexample in 1905. He was motivated by the belief that a 
satisfactory understanding of Maxwell’s electrodynamics required the speed of 
light to be a finite constant, invariant under change of inertial frame of 
reference. Yet the Lorentz transformation was never confined to 
electromagnetism. It led at once to a Lorentz invariant revision of the laws of 
mechanics. From the start, the transformations were understood as a formal 
demand on any matter theory in physics. They are at the foundation of all. 
A question naturally arises: what constraints on transformations does 
the Relativity of Motion, just by itself, demand? The principle assumes deep 
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and familiar symmetries of space and time long taken as among a priori 
necessities in Euclidean geometry. Once we make these assumptions explicit 
we can find a determinate answer to the question. Explicitly, assume the 
homogeneity of space and time (laws don’t change over time), and isotropy of 
space11, already implied in Euclidean geometry and classical views of time. 
Despite Minkowski’s saying he begins ‘with the accepted mechanics of the 
day’ his conclusion actually obliges us to revise that mechanics. It is really 
from these geometric premisses, underpinning the relativity of motion, rather 
than mechanics in full, that both arguments begin. The algebra machine 
cranks out a result. It yields the form of the Lorentz transformations with an 
undetermined constant, c, just as in Minkowski’s more intuitive, approach. 
Work in this style began with Ignatowski as early as 1910. There is 
now a considerable physics literature12 proposing more or less minor variants 
on routes to the same conclusion.  
The calculations are not our interest. Again, no appeal is made to 
electromagnetism or light nor to assumptions about simultaneity. 
 
4 Truthmakers for spatial relations 
 
On the face of it, these arguments imply that space, time and their 
union in spacetime inhabit the ground floor of ontology as first order 
members. Yet, since an order of deduction or speculation does not, by itself, 
entail an order of causality or being, that needs to be argued. 
 It is tempting to think that spatiotemporal symmetries must rest on 
matter-physics or, at least, that electromagnetism sneaks in to determine the 
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value of c. There are interesting reasons not to yield to this temptation. It is 
wise at least to contemplate spacetime’s independent sovereignty.  
In this section, metaphysical arguments precede brief, elementary 
remarks in later sections on three kinds of matter theory.  I sketch a spatial 
realism that begins as theory of spatial relations among objects; it is intended 
as a model for temporal and spatiotemporal realism, too. Although realism is 
almost always stated as a doctrine about points, the metaphysics of this theory 
ignores them. Spatial relationism has ambitions for the adequacy of just those 
spatial relations that hold among observables: do they equip us to say all we 
want about space and time? But there is a primary, deeper question – what is 
the nature of spatial relations? Unless that can be answered in relationist 
fashion, the realist may ignore the ambitions of adequacy. They are irrelevant 
to the argument of this section. 
 The main ontological question is about the truthmakers for spatial 
relation propositions. The splendid Lawrence Sklar says: ‘… attempts to 
define the “spatiality” of spatial relations are usually taken as ineffective or 
unintelligible, so I will simply give the relationist his designated family of 
relations'.13 Sklar explicitly bypasses the main problem. 
One might think that actually Sklar gives a good reason for refusing to 
hand over the family of relations. The realist is bluntly rebuffed, turned away 
empty handed. So it may seem. But Sklar’s gift is a proposal to ignore the 
truthmaker problem, so as to get on with a secondary one – are relations 
among objects adequate for spatial (spatiotemporal) discourse? Sklar’s great 
and rare merit is that he is candid and aware of this. He doesn’t presuppose a 
relationist answer – he confesses that he has no answer. His gift reflects no 
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worse on realist truthmakers for spatial relations than on any other. If the 
secondary question is merely about the discursive adequacy of a limited class 
of spatial relation statements, it does not deny realism. The adequacy of 
Sklar’s gift is irrelevant; what matters is its nature. Mere secondary 
relationism risks being realism in denial. 
 Let’s go back a bit. It is an entrenched belief that nothing intrinsic to 
an object tells us where it is, whether there are other objects anywhere, how 
distant it is from any other, whether it is between two other objects and so on. 
Spatial relations hold independently of anything intrinsic to things they relate. 
Spatial relations are not grounded in the natures of their terms. That this 
poses a problem is stark in the particular case of distance. It is a symmetric 
relation, but, unlike easy symmetric relations, it has nothing at all to do with 
the intrinsic properties of the things it relates. So what grounds this relation, 
and what grounds other, e.g. non-metrical relations – ternery ones like 
‘between’, say?  
 Further, what grounds a spatial separation and connection of a thing 
to itself, as the North Pole is separated from and connected to itself via 
infinitely many distinct longitudinal geodesics? In Max Black’s well-known 
counter example to the Identity of Indiscernibles14, it is assumed that, because 
indiscernible iron spheres are at a spatial distance, the relation must be 
irreflexive, and then they are indeed two spheres. But that might fail. What 
makes them two is not just that they are in the same space, separated and 
connected, but that there is, for example, no array of distinct spatial relations 
that gives the space the global topology of S3, not E3. Neither the nature of 
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any iron sphere nor the existence of numerous but unspecified spatial 
relations settles that. 
If the entrenched beliefs are true, truthmakers are needed for spatial - 
and temporal - relations that include more than their terms. Formally, the 
sentence (where F is an intrinsic property): 
 
∃x Fx & ∃x ~Fx 
 
entails that there are non-identical objects, but not that any relation 
independent of F holds between them. Nor does any necessary ontological 
principle ensure it. So, something more is demanded to ground spatial 
relations than the existence and intrinsic properties of the things. What?  
The entrenched beliefs allow just two options. First, spatial relations 
might be definable in terms of other non-spatiotemporal relations grounded 
in their terms (the main object of Sklar’s justified despair). Causal relations 
have been front runners in this race to explicate spatiality, a race that has 
never ended with a breasting of the tape, but only with a bogging down in one 
or another quagmire of the sort Sklar gloomily indicates. Second, they might 
be mediated relations, i.e. their complete truthmakers include something real 
but not a property, and thus independent of the terms and their natures. 
Obviously, if properties don’t do the work, it is paths that spatially separate 
and connect things. Maybe this, too, is an object of Sklar’s dismay. But, I will 
argue, that they are effective and intelligible. 
The argument just given yields a minimal spatial realism.  It casts 
entities in the role of mediators for spatial relations among things, entities that 
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are not of the ontic type of things of physics or objects of perception. Thing-
terms in spatial relations shed no light on spatiality: the mediator must do 
that. 
The obvious entities may be described, pretty well synonymously, as 
paths, separators-and-connectors or spatial relators. Space is their fusion, but 
this omits much. “Path”, like space and time themselves, is a primitive ideas - 
too familiar and basic to admit definition in other terms, yet clear and simple 
enough to be described. By contrast, it is no good making a primitive of 
something merely because it is a mystery – as Sklar explicitly does. Just as 
there may be scholia to definitions, telling us about the thing defined without 
defining it, primitives need description. Newton limned the essences of space 
and time, not in the section on definitions, but in its famous sequel, the 
Scholium. His essentialist style may repel, but his explication of primitives is 
exemplary.  
“Path” is a familiar word and paths are familiar in concrete 
experience, separating and connecting things. We might see just two objects, 
exactly similar to perception: they are separated yet, since seen together, 
connected. True, we do not see separating, connecting paths; they aren’t 
visual objects. Yet we do immediately see that there is a path. We need not 
see an occupant of it. We move along paths, look along and across them, trace 
them and so on. They are among the commonest entities encountered in 
concrete, immediate perception and action. For example, there is no pole star 
for the southern hemisphere, but there is a night-sky recipe for southing. 
Project the long axis of the Southern Cross. Where it intersects the 
perpendicular from the mid-point of the line joining the “pointer” stars, is the 
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rotational south pole of the sky. It’s an easy (straight) path-tracing recipe. No 
intervening stars are easily seen. Thus it seems best to say that they are 
concrete entities familiar in perception. 
Nevertheless, paths are certainly a discursive problem. We are unsure 
how to talk about them; especially just how to describe their ontic type, 
obvious in perception though they may be. But if the argument so far is 
sound, it may be useful to hazard a preliminary description: paths in space 
(spacetime) are concrete particulars, immediate in perception, sovereign over 
and independent of matter, formally objects of reference and bearers of 
properties, but substantial in no richer sense. 15 
Perceptual immediacy does not entail infallibility.  For example, we 
are poor judges of the distance from ourselves of two stars seen as separated 
and connected, so we misjudge the linking path’s orientation. We see the stars 
as linked by a spatial rather than a spacetime path, since we don’t see that the 
light from one is from an event much earlier than that from the other. What 
we trace are spacetime paths, linking point events perhaps widely separated 
and connected both in space and in time. But it is immediate, not inferred, 
that there are paths: they are not small, not hidden, not elusive, not invisible 
substances, not theoretical things. There is no need for a mere structural 
realism of paths. They are quite unlike the hidden entities of micro theories 
and their properties. They are visibly, tangibly there whenever we see things 
or move to grasp them. 
That tells us so little about paths that it might baffle rather than 
enlighten: for instance, it does not entail that paths are one-dimensional or 
straight. I sketch a few plausible features to help domesticate Modest Realism. 
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To confine myself to what is plausibly metaphysics, I stick to mereological 
remarks. 
A multitude of objects requires a multitude of paths separating and 
connecting pairs of things: some will pass through other objects, some not. 
Some have paths as proper parts. Paths, I suggest’ intersect in paths (not, yet, 
points). Less modestly – Bold Realism if you like – some spatial relations hold 
between paths and things; others between paths and paths; perhaps all paths 
have paths as proper parts. Only here do we strike an issue about the 
adequacy for discourse of spatial relations just among things. These further 
steps to bold realism look plausible once we take the first. They add no ontic 
types or conceptual load to ontology, but only more paths. Rash Realism is the 
view that continuity and differentiability are among basic primitive properties 
of any spacetime. These postulates are pragmatic - there to legitimate the use 
of differential equations. There is no metaphysical reason to accept them, so 
none to accept points. None of these realisms presupposes a global topology, 
nor any metric. Only bold and rash realists quarrel with secondary 
relationists. Mediation is the core ontological difference between realists and 
primary relationists. It is modest realism that admits space to ontology as a 
first order entity, conceptually unique and primitive. 
The present section’s main conclusion is this: a metaphysical theory of 
spatiality entails that the properties of space and time are not founded on 
observables or their properties, but are path-mediated. Paths are not 
explicated though the nature of their occupants or terminants. Space is their 
fusion. 
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5 SR and matter theories 
 
(i) The general structure of field theories 
 
A field is a plenum, not a complex of spatial relations among things. Variable 
quantities, the values of some matter theory such as electromagnetism, are 
assigned continuously and smoothly, for classical fields, to points of spacetime. 
Spacetime underlies the field and not vice versa. Fields presuppose 
rash realism. Continuity and smoothness are imposed on path separation and 
connection to yield points at which field values hold. We have no 
understanding how matter theories or field values could provide any of this 
structure. Every field presupposes it, each in the same way. A field structure of 
paths and points is independent of how the field is sourced physically, or of 
how complex its values (vectors, tensors) may be at points. Electromagnetic 
field values do not spread spacetime; spacetime spreads the field values. Our 
current concept of (non-abstract) field makes spacetime prior. 
Quantum physics may change that. One gauge-theoretic approach to 
GR (General Relativity) would reduce spacetime curvature to a spin-2 
particle (graviton) gauge-field. So far, this is more a hope of quantum gravity 
than an achievement.16 Various attempts to place GR on a non-geometric 
(e.g. a bimetric)17 footing are current but none has yet succeeded. Richer 
geometric structure with strings would supersede the present approach. But, 
in standard GR, as we find it in the mainstream chapters of Gravitation18, 
spacetime, in the sense that Minkowski invented, is the principal entity. I am 
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arguing for a realism that understands “spacetime” in GR as directly 
referential without a need to reparse it. 
 
(ii) Electromagnetism 
 
The impression may well remain that electromagnetism plays a dominant 
role in fixing the finitude and the specific value of the fundamental constant c. 
However, for many theories, the observed value of a main constant is not 
rooted in its structure. Only observation yields the values; they are brute. 
This is a strong claim, but it is directly acknowledged in the many ‘fine 
tuning’ arguments afloat. These note that many fundamental constants are 
improbably finely adjusted to each other in ways not demanded by the 
fundamentals of the theory. Without that tuning, life as we know it - indeed 
any life at all - would be impossible. Thus Paul Davies:   
 
 In the present state of our knowledge the 20 odd parameters 
that appear in the standard model of particle physics seem to 
just be completely free, they're not determined by any 
underlying theory. But what is clear is that if some of them have 
values even a little bit different from those that they do, then 
there could be no life in the universe.19  
 
 
So constants could be revalued without insult to the structure of the theories 
that give rise to them. A derivation of dimensional constants, such as c, looks 
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very unlikely. (We need not suppose that constants are somehow arranged to 
give us an easy ride.) 
This view of c in particular, is tacitly endorsed in many good popular 
versions of SR. For instance, Gamow’s well-known early story20 sets c at 10 
miles per hour. This rewrites the covariant consequences of the theory on 
domestic scales without changing the structure of electromagnetism or 
mechanics in SR. For instance, c may still be defined as the ratio of the 
electromagnetic to the electrostatic unit of electricity. All the features of 
Gamow’s story fit the general physics perfectly – it is electromagnetism, but 
slowed down. 
Light moves at the constant invariant maximum speed because it is a 
zero mass particle; light doesn’t determine what that speed is. 
 
(iii)   Mechanics. 
Newton’s first law underpins the relativity motion in its standard form: 
the laws of physics are invariant under transformation to inertial frames of 
reference (privileged frames). The law is: 
 
Every body persists in its state of rest or of moving 
uniformly straight ahead, except insofar as it is compelled 
to change its state by forces impressed.21 
 
Already this broadly hints that not all of mechanics is matter theory. 
Remarkably, the law says nothing at all about the properties or causal powers 
of any body to which it might apply. Remarkably, too, we have good classical 
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reason to think that no body ever actually escapes the (gravitational) causal 
net or persists in its state of rest or uniform motion (although there might be 
some bodies on which the resultant of forces is zero, briefly or not). The law is 
not about bodies; it is about trajectories, spatio-temporal entities, not about 
what might occupy them. It tells us nothing of how any such trajectory ever 
comes to be occupied or how an occupying body persists in its force-free state 
so as to be extended along it or, indeed, to persist at all. That is no part of the 
law’s message. The second law requires that all bodies have mass; the first has 
no requirement. It demands only that causes are needed to drive a thing off its 
inertial trajectory - if the thing goes on existing.  
The same is true for SR. If any body exemplifies the law, it remains at 
rest in an inertial frame. It remains, that is, in a state, for which explanation 
or cause is neither needed nor, in simplest cases, intelligible: nothing is done 
or suffered by things that simply stay put. That is the importance for 
dynamics of the non-causal case: the force-free trajectory with zero 
acceleration. Matter theories are disengaged – their forces and fields are 
inactive. 
 The first law really is first. It is conceptually simpler and theoretically 
deeper than the second. Once we can decide simply when forces are on or off, 
it identifies the frames of reference (candidate rest states) that are the 
foundation of the whole theory. To a large extent, Newton decided the issue 
of forces by seeing uniform motion as free from impressed forces (impacts, 
pushes and pulls) and gravity. This laid a crucial groundwork: candidate 
forces should have (i) observable sources, and (ii) regularities governing (a) 
when and (b) how they are at work. This pretty completely rules out arbitrary, 
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conventional forces. Only when we have the right frames of reference and, by 
implication, the right transformation group, may we explore accelerations 
relative to them in a comprehensive way; only then can forces be quantified 
and oriented and the theory tested. You can apply the second law and verify 
that second derivatives are at the core of dynamics. That the second law 
entails the first, does not rob the first of first place. 
There is no mystery about this, contrary to Brown22. It demands no 
conspiracy among objects to behave in certain ways. It is not even about 
objects or their properties. Any object that exemplifies the first law is at rest; 
that is, it has no behaviour beyond continuing to exist. It need ‘know’ nothing 
of the dynamical state of any other object23.  
Now for a quick glance into GR. Its analogue of the first law is that 
spacetime geodesics are force-free trajectories. Here it really is clear that the 
law is not about the occupants of these trajectories, nor about any of their 
properties. The fiction of a point mass allows us to say that the point may be 
taken as at rest without need to postulate any gravitational force in its local IF 
to keep it in place. It is in a free float/free fall state. But a strict point mass in 
GR would be a black hole! More significantly, GR does not characterize the 
inertial motion of bodies save in quite special geometrical cases. Bodies are 
extended and their spacelike cross sections are intersected by infinitely many 
distinct geodesics. In a curved region of spacetime, these geodesics mutually 
deviate. So worldlines of points within any body tend to move closer or apart 
in their inertial motions, despite the 4-acceleration on each geodesic being 0 
everywhere. This deviation changes the distances of points from each other 
and thus the equilibrium forces between them. In general, a body’s trajectory 
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won’t be geodesical, nor will that of any geometric point within it. Thus 
despite the formally interesting fact that the field equation entails GR’s law of 
motion, there are no free fall trajectories of extended bodies save in special 
cases where the curvature is 0. 
I conclude that mechanics does not imply or suggest that the 
structures of space, time and spacetime derive from the physics of matter.24 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
First, this is an essay in metaphysics, not physics. It’s about a concept 
that plays a major role in GR. There it is a fundamental, highly articulated 
entity rich in explanatory consequences within the most powerful, elegant and 
intelligible theory ever to grace physics. GR may fail and probably will. If it 
fails so as to undermine the role of geometry in relativity, then curved 
spacetime, like Newton’s absolute space, will be history. But, in the long run, 
we are all dead and everything is history. Till then, the ground-floor place of 
spacetime in present ontology and its clarity and its central role in one superb 
theory, has to be of fundamental metaphysical interest, well worth positive 
exploration rather than the reflex impulse to expel it.  
Second, GR was the first theory of physics to be formulated 
presupposing only minimal structure for its background space. This is the 
merely differential manifold i.e. pure rash realism. Its weak structure is 
hospitable to a wide range of geometrically different models. Only 
separation/connection and smoothness are given in the manifold. Other 
geometric and matter (dynamic) properties are encoded in tensors (complexes 
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of vectors). Thus the most basic properties of space and time, separation and 
connection of tensor locations, are clearly primitive postulates of GR. 
Smoothness and continuity get in, pragmatically, to justify points and the use 
of differential equations. There is no understanding how to encode these 
deepest features of spacetime from any tensor field envisaged in GR, else that 
would surely have been done. They are accessed in familiar experience. 
Last, the symmetries to which Minkowski appealed are global in his 
spacetime. The spacetimes envisaged in the full range of GR models have 
those symmetries only locally. But, significantly, they hold in the tangent 
spaces common to each point in any model. 
The metaphysics of spacetime deserves closer and more sympathetic 
attention than is usually given it. 
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